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Abstract:   Existing research on tournament-style contests suggests that mechanisms to sort 
contestants by ability level are unnecessary in the case of linear relative-performance contracts.  
This paper suggests that this result stems from uniform treatment of workers’ marginal returns 
from effort, marginal disutilities of effort, and reservation wages.   Here, we investigate relative-
performance contracts with a model that allows these three factors to vary by growers’ 
unobservable ability.  Given this framework, we find that it is possible for processors to improve 
expected profits and total expected welfare by replacing a single contract offering meant to pool 
all growers with an offering of two contracts meant to separate growers by ability.  Under some 
circumstances, a “cream-skimming” contract offering designed to attract only workers above a 
minimum ability level can also improve expected profits. 
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   1
Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts 
 
When output is stochastic, conditioned on workers’ efforts or abilities, and correlated 
across workers, tournament-style relative-performance contracts are found to exhibit numerous 
efficient properties (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Green and Stokey 1983; 
Holmström 1982; Malcomson 1986).   While tournament-style contests are incorporated into 
many labor-market settings, such as those where salespersons compete for bonuses or employees 
compete for promotions, perhaps the best known and studied setting involves the use of contracts 
between poultry companies and broiler growers (e.g., Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Levy and 
Vukina, 2002 and 2004; Goodhue, 2000; Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 2001).  Within a particular 
settlement group, broiler growers are offered a single, pooled contract containing an incentive 
clause based on the growers’ relative performance within the group.  Standard results suggest 
that when growers’ performances are random but conditioned on their efforts, pooling contracts 
with relative-performance clauses outperform piece-rate contracts if risks common to all growers 
in the group dominate individual risks.  In other words, by basing an incentive payment on an 
individual grower’s relative performance, broiler contracts are designed to provide high-powered 
individual incentives while minimizing the noisiness of the performance measure.   
When heterogeneous and hidden grower abilities are taken into account, however, some of 
the efficiency properties of broiler contracts are lessened and, in fact, depend on the exact 
structure of the contract.  For example, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that heterogeneous, 
mixed-type contests create inefficiencies in rank-order tournaments.  For these tournament 
schemes, Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 858) suggest that handicapping or non-price rationing can 
alleviate some of the inefficiencies, but that a “pure price,” incentive pay mechanism that   2
induces self-selection cannot be sustained.
1  On the other hand, Knoeber and Thurman (1994) 
suggest that linear relative-performance evaluation schemes – those where the incentive payment 
is proportional to the gap between individual and group average performance – do not lose their 
efficiency with heterogeneous contests because higher-ability growers have “no incentive to rest 
on their laurels” and lower-ability growers have “no incentive to accept their fate” (Knoeber and 
Thurman, 1994, p.170).  These claims are echoed by Levy and Vukina, who say that relative-
performance contracts do not provide principals an incentive to sort mixed-ability agents into 
homogeneous groups (Levy and Vukina, 2004, p. 354).
2   The general implication of this line of 
research is that mechanisms to sort different ability contestants are either unnecessary, as in the 
case of relative-performance contracts, or costly, as in the case of the rank-order tournament 
contracts.   
  This paper suggests that the Knoeber and Thurman finding, however, depends on several 
commonly employed assumptions used in relative-performance contracting models.  First, most 
models of relative-performance contracts specify that agents’ marginal rewards for improved 
performance are identical no matter whether agents are more or less able (e.g., Knoeber and 
Thurman 1994, p. 161; Levy and Vukina 2004, p.354-355).  Second, many models likewise 
assume that agents’ marginal disutility of effort does not vary by agents’ ability.  And third, to 
the best of our knowledge, all models investigating relative-performance contracts assume that 
all agents within a contest have identical outside opportunities (or reservation utilities), even if 
they are also assumed to have heterogeneous abilities (e.g., Levy and Vukina 2002; Tsoulouhas 
and Vukina 2001).  In the standard principal-agent framework, these assumptions manifest 
                                                 
1 Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988) offer a solution to this inefficiency by constructing a contest that compares one 
ability group’s performance against another’s.   
2 Levy and Vukina (2004) focus on a separate problem associated with mixing agents of heterogeneous abilities:  
namely, they investigate the risk associated with random composition of agents – i.e., random league composition.   3
themselves most importantly in the specification of workers’ incentive and participation 
constraints.  More to the point, these assumptions help lead to the finding that sorting by ability 
is unnecessary when relative-performance contracts are used.   
  In this paper, we expand on the relatively standard model of relative-performance 
contracts in a number of ways, most importantly by allowing an agent’s ability to affect his 
marginal reward, marginal disutility, and outside opportunities.  To the best of our knowledge, 
these model extensions represent important departures from previous studies of incentives in 
relative-performance contracts.
3  Despite the extensions, however, our principal-agent model, 
described in the next section, is largely consistent with the standard features of existing 
contracting models.   The standard model often allows for either moral hazard when agents’ 
efforts are assumed to be unobservable (e.g., Knoeber and Thurman 1994; Levy and Vukina 
2002), adverse selection when agents’ abilities are likewise assumed to be unobservable (e.g., 
Goodhue
4 2000), or both (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Yun 1997). Our model incorporates both 
moral hazard and adverse selection.  The standard model also often specifies growers’ output as 
having both a deterministic portion based on growers’ efforts (and maybe their abilities) and a 
stochastic portion with both individual and common shocks (e.g., Levy and Vukina 2004).  Our 
model also has these standard components; however, we employ a relatively uncommon output 
specification to allow for the marginal reward from effort to vary by ability level.  Finally, we 
restrict our model in two important ways:  First, we restrict the contract type to linear contracts 
with a base-pay component and an incentive component that depends on gap between individual 
                                                 
3 They may have precedent, however, in other lines other research areas.  For example, heterogeneous outside 
opportunities are often employed in the more general context of investigating labor mobility, unemployment, and so-
called “efficiency wages”  (e.g., Weiss, 1990; Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz, 1988; Kahn, 1988; McLaughlin, 1991; 
Arvin and Arnott, 1992; Ito, 1988; and Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001).   
4 Goodhue (2000) discusses but does not model the case with both adverse selection and moral hazard.   4
and group-average output.  And second, we assume the number of agents is fixed, and that an 
offering of separating contracts is feasible only if it is acceptable to all agents. 
Using this expanded model, we find that it is generally possible for a principal (e.g., a 
poultry processor) to improve profitability by replacing its usual single offering of a contract that 
pools all heterogeneous agents (e.g., poultry growers) with an offering of two contracts that 
separates growers into two groups of abilities – high and low.
5  As opposed to the single, pooling 
contract, we find that two separating contracts can reduce expected utility for low-ability growers 
but increase it for high-ability growers.  These results are sensitive, however, to how grower 
abilities are distributed.    
Under some circumstances, we also find that a single “cream-skimming” contract offering 
that pools only growers above a minimum ability level, rather than pooling all growers, can 
sometimes improve processor profits over a pooling contract (but not over separating contracts).
6  
The cream-skimming contract often increases the average utility of participating growers’ over 
the average utility of growers in the pooling contract.  While we find that a cream-skimming 
contract generally leads to lower processor profits than two separating contracts, extra 
transaction costs or political costs (not modeled) associated with a second contract offering could 
justify its use.  In fact, we may have little way of knowing that a cream-skimming contract is not 
already employed by some poultry processors.  For example, industry observers witness a single 
contract offering and generally assume it is a pooling contract; but grower turnover could be 
                                                 
5 A number of background assumptions are behind this result:  First, a sorting equilibrium is by no means 
guaranteed.  In this paper, we focus on the results from specifications where a sorting equilibrium is possible rather 
than investigating the sufficient conditions for an equilibrium’s existence. Second, we also do not examine the case 
when a second principal offers a competing set of contracts to the same set of agents. And third, we only investigate 
the case where agents are separated into two groups, where the arbitrary number two is chosen for simplicity.    
6 The term “cream skimming” is often used in settings of asymmetric information where the party with hidden 
information is able to use that information to his or her advantage.  For example, it is often used in the health 
insurance sector where it may be possible for insurers or health maintenance organizations to target only the 
healthiest customers.  For more examples of how cream skimming may be used, see, for example, Asheim and 
Nilssen (1996); Barros (2003); Lewis and Sappington (1995); and Marchand, Sato, and Schokkaert (2003).     5
evidence that cream-skimming is currently occurring.  The less than full employment outcome 
that results from the cream-skimming contract offering is consistent with numerous efficiency 
wage and labor studies where adverse selection is present (e.g., Weiss 1990; Shapiro and Stiglitz 
1984; Carmichael 1985 and 1990; Jovanovich 1979).   After the model development and some 
analytic manipulations, these results are established with the help of a numerical example.  We 
conclude the paper with a discussion of limitations and policy implications.  
The Model 
For a starting point, we rely on a standard principal-agent model that bases individual 
incentive compensation on a group benchmark.  While the model is general, it is most concretely 
applied to the broiler industry.  We will therefore use the term “growers” to mean agents 
working on behalf of a single poultry processor, i.e., the principal.  In the broiler industry, 
grower compensation clauses in standard broiler contracts contain a base payment and a bonus or 
discount payment depending on how well growers perform against the average performance of a 
specified group of n growers.  The calculation of the group’s average performance includes all 
growers whose flocks were harvested at approximately the same time.  In addition, for 
computational purpose, we assume that a fixed comparison group is adopted by the processor.
 7  
Given this setup, a simplified payment function for grower i under a relative-performance 
contract can be constructed as: 








j i i x
n
x w β α , 
                                                 
7 Levy and Vukina (2004) distinguish broiler contracts with a random comparison league and fixed comparison 
league.  For this study, a fixed comparison league is assumed only for computational purposes.  However, it may be 
plausible to assume that broiler processors usually contract with relatively fixed broiler growers due to regional 
restrictions.  Also note that the group average performance benchmark, described in (1), includes grower i.     6
where xi is grower i’s live output of broilers, α is the base payment, and β is the incentive bonus.  
We further assume that the live output produced by each grower is given by  ) , , , ( i i i i u z a e x x = , 
where  i e  is grower i’s effort,  i a  is grower i’s ability realized before the contract is signed, z is a 
common shock borne by all growers, and  i u is an idiosyncratic shock faced by grower i.  We 
assume that z is an i.i.d. normal random variable with mean zero and variance
2
z σ ,  i u  is an i.i.d 
normally distributed random variable across growers with mean zero and variance 
2
u σ , and  i a  is 
randomly distributed in the range  ] , [ a a with  ∞ < < < a a 0 .
8  Recall that we assume that neither 
growers’ abilities nor efforts are directly observable by the processor.  However, the distributions 
of the random shocks and growers’ abilities are public information to both the processor and all 
growers, and the processor can only observe growers’ outputs at the time of transaction.  
The following output structure is used for this study: 




i i u z e a x + + =φ  , 
where the coefficients p and q can be thought of as returns-to-scale parameters common to all 
broiler growers, and the scalar φ is an arbitrary constant.  Unlike previous research that specifies 
(2) as additive in ability and effort, the multiplicative form allows for growers’ marginal product 
of effort to vary by ability.
9  Assuming fixed comparison groups over time, the variance of  i x  is 
thus
2 2 ) var( u z i x σ σ + =  and the covariance between any i x and  j x  is 
2 ) , cov( z j i x x σ = .  While 
agents’ abilities are assumed to be known to growers before the contract is signed, the processor 
cannot distinguish grower abilities, and each grower cannot distinguish other growers’ abilities 
either before or after the contract is signed.   
                                                 
8 A number of explicit distributions for ai will be specified later for numerical simulation.   
9 Goodhue (2000) represents an exception to the additive specification:  she assumes that p = 1, q < 1, and adds a 
variable that reflects purchased inputs.  Later in the paper, we examine a special case of (2) where p = 0, q = 1, and φ 
= 1, which corresponds to the standard additive specification.   7
The processor is risk neutral and has a profit function, ∑ = − =
n
i i i w x w x
1 ) ( ) , ( π , where  i w  is 
specified in (1), and the processor’s output price is normalized to one.  Each grower with 
ability i a  has a time-separable utility function  ) , ( ) ( ) , , ( i i i i i i i a e C w u a e w U − = , where the utility 








a e C = , a 
specification that allows for heterogeneous marginal disutilities of effort.  Further, we adopt the 
commonly used assumption that growers’ utility functions have the property of constant absolute 
risk aversion,  ) exp( 1 ) ( i i rw w u − − = , where r is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk 







)] ( [ i
i
i i i e
a
w r Ew U E − − ∝ ⋅ .   
Here and throughout the essay, we use E to represent the mathematical expectation operator 
conditional on information available at the beginning of the period.   
A Single Offering of a Pooling Contract   
In this case, a processor offers a single contract  } , { P P P C β α =  intended to be acceptable to 
all n heterogeneous growers even though it is the growers’ individual choice to accept or reject 
the contract.  As usual, the offered contract specifies a payment schedule depending on {αP, βP, 
x}.  Given the pooling contract and the assumptions described above, the processor maximizes 
its expected profits, ΠP, subjected to incentive-compatibility constraints and growers’ 
participation constraints.    
Thus, the processor solves the problem: 
(3)       } ) ( { max
1 , ∑ = − = Π
n
i i i a P Ew Ex E
β α  
subject to     8
(4)       i a u e
a
w r Ew EU i i
i







2 ,    and  
(5)       i e
a
w r Ew e i
i








The participation constraint (4) states that each grower of heterogeneous ability obtains at least 
his reservation utility  ) ( 0 i a u under the pooling contract offered by the processor, while the 
incentive-compatibility constraint (5) requires that each grower optimally chooses his effort by 
maximizing his expected utility.  An important departure from most models is that each 
heterogeneous grower is associated with a different reservation utility.  Here we assume that 
) ( 0 i a u increases with i a because higher-ability growers are likely to face better outside options.
10   
The solution to this problem, which relies on the specifications of wi in (1) and xi in (2), is 
fairly standard.  One assumes that one of the participation constraints is binding because, 
otherwise, the processor can always reduce the payment to the growers until it reaches their 
reservation utility level.
11  Without loss of generality, it is assumed here that the processor offers 
a contract such that only the grower with the lowest ability, a,  obtains his reservation utility, and 
all other grower types capture strictly greater utility relative to their reservation utility.   Given 
this setup, we offer the standard solution next. 















( ( .  Thus, the processor’s total expected 
profit can be written as  } {
1 ∑ = − = Π
n
i i a P n Ex E α .  In addition, the total expected welfare, WP, of 
all growers and the processor is 
                                                 
10 Heterogeneous outside opportunities are more common in efficiency wage literature (e.g., Weiss).  When we later 
specify the exact shape of u0(ai), we will assume that outside opportunities vary by ability in the same general way 
that a contract grower’s expected utility does.  To be specific, u0(ai) will have the same order in ai (i.e., ai will be 
raised to the same power) as the contract grower’s expected utility.  The order of ai will depend on p and q. 
11 Good references on this topic include Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995) and Salanié (1997). 
   9
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With the optimal pooling contract denoted as } , { P P P C β α = , the payment to each grower 
becomes  ] [ ]
1
[
1 x x x
n
x w i P P
n
j j i P P i − + = − + = ∑ = β α β α ,  i ∀ .  Hence, we could compute the 
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Note that the variance of each grower’s payment depends only on the idiosyncratic shock 
without being affected by the common shock.   
Substituting Ewi and var(wi) into the processor’s problem (3) - (5) yields 
  } ) { max
1 , ∑ = − = Π
n
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From the incentive-compatibility constraint, each grower chooses the optimal effort such that  















i i β φ .    10
Hence, from (2), the expected output for each grower type  i a  is 
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in its own type.  
Based on this observation, we assume that each grower type’s reservation utility has the same 
order in  i a as its expected utility function.
12  More specifically, each type’s reservation utility 
takes the following form: 
q
q p






0 ) ( , where k is a positive constant. 
When the grower with the lowest ability, a,  obtains his reservation utility, one participation 
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If we denote the optimal effort exerted by ability type a as e, we find that 
  
2 2 2





























− = ∑ ≠ = σ β φ φ β α . 
The processor’s total profit under this contract becomes  
                                                 
12 If each grower’s expected utility and reservation utility have different orders in ability, then the participation 
constraints could easily be violated for some range of grower types.  An economic rationale for this mathematical 
necessity is that ability may be expected to have similar effects on utility, both inside and outside the contract 
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In particular, when p = q =1, the optimal bonus payment becomes 
     

















The most prominent feature of this bonus payment is that it is independent of the common shock.  
In addition, it is negatively related to the risk aversion coefficient and the variance of 
idiosyncratic shocks.  An increase in mean ability has an ambiguous effect on the bonus 
payment, all else equal. 
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Hence, we can compute the processor’s total profit, ΠP, under the optimal single-
tournament relative-performance contract: 
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1
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and the total expected welfare, WP, of both the processor and all growers,  
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An Offering of Two Separating Contracts 
In this section, we assume that the processor offers all growers two contracts intended to 
separate them by ability levels.  The processor thereby constructs two tournaments, with each 
tournament customized to a different group of growers based on their abilities.  Recall that 
growers’ ability is randomly distributed in the range  ] , [ a a .  We suppose the processor offers a 
menu of two contracts,   }} , { }, , {{ } , { B B G G B G S C C C β α β α = = , where the contract  G C  attracts 
more able grower types with  ] , ˆ [ a a ai ∈ , the contract  B C  attracts less able growers type with 
) ˆ , [ a a ai ∈ , and a ˆ  is the ability level that separates higher-ability growers from lower-ability 
growers.  Aided by the revelation principle, we examine the case where CG is accepted 
“truthfully” by growers of a ˆ  ability and above and CB is accepted by growers lower ability than 
a ˆ . 
Given the contracts, the processor rewards each grower accepting CG with 
G





i x x w − + = β α .  Hence, the expected payment for each grower of type  a a
G
i ˆ >  is:  










i x E e a x E Ex x x E Ew − + = − + = − + = φ β α β α β α .  Denote the 
number of growers in the high-ability group as G.   Since each grower cannot foresee the exact 
number of growers in the group he participates, the expected relative standard that each grower i 
competes against takes the following form:   
, ) ) ( ) ( (
) 1 (
) ) ( ) ( (
1
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1
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G np a a a prob n n = ∈ = ]) , ˆ [ ( is the expected number of growers in the more able league.   
Note that the last two equalities are only applicable asymptotically, which requires a sufficiently 
large number of participants in the contracts.  Hence,  
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)], ) ( ) ( (
1
) ) ( ) ( (
1

























+ = − + =  and 
2 2 2 1








x x w σ β β
−
= − = , where 
B
i
B np a a a prob n n = ∈ = )) ˆ , [ (  is the expected 
number of growers in the less able league.   
Given the offering of CS = {CG, CB}, the processor obtains total expected profit, ΠS, where   14
(6)    
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
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The optimal contracts must satisfy the following set of constraints.  First, the participation 
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0 ) ( .   Because it applies to both the single pooling contract and 
two separating contracts, this assumption will guarantee that each type-specific grower type 
faces the same outside opportunities no matter which contract is actually offered.  It also 
guarantees that the growers’ expected utility and reservation utility will have the same order in 
ai, a condition that aids in finding a solution.  Intuitively, this assumption implies that growers’ 
utility will take similar forms, both inside and outside the contract sector. 
Second, the optimal effort of each grower the higher-ability group must satisfy an 
incentive-compatibility constraint, 
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Hence, the expected output from each higher-ability grower type is  
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Hence, the expected output from each lower-ability grower type is  
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) , ( β φ β φ . 
In addition to the above sets of constraints, the optimal contracts must satisfy another pair 
of incentive-compatibility constraints described as truth-telling constraints.  More specifically, 
faced with two separating contracts, it must be optimal for each grower type to choose his own 
league rather than the other league.  Before formulating these constraints, additional notation 
must be defined.   
Since each grower’s reward is associated with the relative difference between his 
performance and the group average, one grower’s deviation from choosing his own league would   16
also affect the average performance of the group in which the grower actually participates.  Thus, 
if one high-ability grower i deviates and joins the less able league, given all other growers 
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payment are 
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Therefore, the deviating high-ability grower optimally chooses the optimal effort by maximizing 
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[ β φ .   17
On the other hand, if one lower-ability grower i deviates and joins the more able league, the 
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i x x w − + = β α .  Hence, its expected payment and 
the variance of its payment are, 
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Finally, the additional truth-telling constraints can be formulated.  Because the processor 
offers two separating contracts based on ability types, each grower must prefer his own contract 
over that designed for the other group.  More precisely, for each grower in the higher-ability 
league,  ] , ˆ [ a a a
G
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Similarly, for each grower in the lower-ability league,  ) ˆ , [ a a a
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Thus, the processor solves the problem in (6) subject to the constraints (7), (8), (9), (11), 
(13), and (14).  However, to find the optimal set of separating contracts, several assumptions are 
necessary.
13  More specifically,  
Assumption 1:  Given (13) and (8), condition (7) can be dropped without affecting the 
optimal contracts.  Thus, condition (7) is non-binding for any high-ability type.  This assumption 
requires that a high-ability grower obtains greater utility when deviating than his reservation 
utility.   
Assumption 2:  One and only one of the constraints in condition (8) can be binding.  
Because the processor targets all growers in the low-ability group with contract CB, only a single 
base payment  B α  can be specified in CB.  Moreover, the processor can always reduce the base 
payment until one of the constraints in (8) binds.  More specifically, we assume that for the 
lower-ability group, only the participation constraint for grower type a is binding.  This 
assumption also implies that condition (14) must be non-binding for lower-ability growers 
because, otherwise, a different B α could be found. 
Assumption 3:  One and only one of the constraints in condition (13) can be binding.  Again, 
because the processor targets all growers in the high-ability group with contract CG, only a single 
base payment  G α  can be specified in CG.  Therefore, only one of the constraints in condition 
(13) can be binding to solve G α .  Without loss of generality, we assume that, under the optimal 
                                                 
13 These assumptions are in general consistent with standard results from contract theory, therefore, no further proof 
is provided in the text.  However, when solutions are later computed, all these assumptions will be verified.   19
contract offering, only the incentive constraint in (13) for the grower with separating ability a ˆ  
will be binding.   
Readers should note that, given the assumptions above, only one particular set of optimal 
contracts can be established.  Any other choice of the binding constraints among (7), (8), (9), 
(11), (13), and (14) would result in a different set of optimal contracts and different optimal 
separating ability a ˆ .  However, in some cases, it may be impossible to find optimal separating 
contracts because the participation constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints could 
be violated
14 
Under these assumptions, the processor’s problem becomes: 
(15) 
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14 Interested readers can investigate the global optimal values of a ˆ  for all other possibilities.  Salanié (1997, pp. 26-
32) provides a thorough discussion of local versus global incentive constraints, and their relationship to the Spence-
Mirrlees condition.   20
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Then, substituting the base payments (18) and (19) and efforts into the processor’s total expected 
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In particular, when p = q =1,  
(21)  
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Similarly, differentiating the processor’s expect profit with respect to B β  yields 
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In this case, it is straightforward to verify that when 
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From (18) and (19), we can obtain the base payments for both groups. 
Finally, the processor’s total expected profit, ΠS, under the optimal separating contracts can 
be computed by the following, 
(24)  
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A Single Offering of a Cream-Skimming Contract  
The results from the previous section can be used to consider a third case:  the offering of 
a single contract that targets growers above a particular ability level.  Conditional on a 
potentially new choice for a ˆ , the processor officers only one contract that is similar to CG, which 
we will now re-label CCS = {αCS, βCS}.  This contract is designed to be accepted by growers with 
ability greater than or equal to a ˆ , and rejected by growers with ability less than a ˆ .  As with the 
separating contracts of the previous section, all the participation and incentive constraints   23
associated with the higher-ability group must still hold, conditional on the potentially new choice 
of a ˆ .  Therefore, the derivation of the optimal contract is omitted.  By offering the cream-
skimming contract, the processor obtains expected profit, ΠCS, where
15 
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Numerical Solution for Optimal Contracts and Optimal a ˆ  
The previous sections derive analytic solutions to the processor’s optimization problem 
conditional on the choice of a ˆ .  We are unable, however, to find analytically the optimal a ˆ  and 
instead turn to numerical solutions.   Given the above optimal contract terms along with 
hypothetical choices for parameters, we numerically establish the optimal value of a ˆ  for each of 
the three cases – pooling, separating, and cream-skimming contract offerings.  Various 
sensitivity analyses are also conducted by varying model parameters.  The general algorithm of 
the numerical solution consists of the following four steps: (i) For any possible separating ability 
level,  ) , ( ˆ a a a∈ , compute the probability, the mean ability, and the expected number of growers 
in each group;  (ii) For each possible a ˆ , compute the contract terms and  then the processor’s 
expected total profit, growers’ expected utility, and total expected welfare; (iii) For each a ˆ , 
check the ex ante efficiency conditions (i.e., the incentive-compatibility conditions and 
                                                 
15 While we conserve notation by using the superscript and subscript G, readers should note that the number of 
growers in the higher-ability group for the cream-skimming contract, n
G, is likely to be different than the number of 
growers in higher-ability group for the separating contracts.  The same cautionary note also holds for wG, amG, and 
eG.    24
participation constraints) for all grower types; and (iv) Compare the processor’s expected total 
profit and total welfare calculations to find the optimal a ˆ  for the separating and cream-skimming 
contract offerings.  Because we assume that each grower has the same utility function and faces 
the same outside opportunities no matter the contract offering, we are able to compare the 
pooling, separating, and cream-skimming results are directly comparable without further 
calibration.  
We assume that grower ability, ai, is given by a Beta distribution. From standard 
distribution theory (Casella and Berger, 1990), a general Beta distribution takes the form:    
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w z .   To examine how sensitive the results are to the distribution 
of grower ability, we consider three different Beta distributions: (i) a symmetric Beta distribution 
with z = 2 and w = 2, (ii) a right-skewed Beta distribution with z = 2 and w = 4, and (iii) a left-
skewed Beta distribution with z = 4 and w = 2.
16  In addition, for each of these three 
distributions, different returns-to-scale parameters p and q will be considered ceteris paribus to 
investigate their effects on the model results.   
For any givena ˆ , the following can be computed numerically for each given distribution: 
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16 A fourth case of Beta distribution, one where z = w = 1 resulting in a uniform distribution, leads results that are 
similar to the symmetric Beta distribution where z = w = 2.    25
      dx
a a a prob
w z x f












)] ˆ , [ [
) , | (
)) ˆ , [ | (,  
where 
s
mG a  and 
s
mB a compute the s
th uncentered conditional moments of grower ability types.  
To further specify the distribution and other model features, we use parameter values in 
Table 1.  These parameters are not chosen to calibrate to some real-world market; instead, they 
are chosen in an ad hoc fashion to help ensure the feasibility of equilibrium outcomes.  While the 
inability to calibrate the  model is an admitted shortcoming, our results focus on whether benefits 
are possible from separating or cream-skimming, rather than what the level of benefits may 
actually be.   Based on the parameters in Table 1, Tables 2, 3, and 4 display the numerical results 
for optimal contract terms and associated results given the three distributions of grower ability 
and a number of different parameter values.  For the separating and cream-skimming cases, only 
the optimal a ˆ ’s that maximize total welfare under are shown.  In some cases, the optimal a ˆ ’s 
coincide.   
Results 
Intuitively, our results suggest that increased grower heterogeneity creates opportunities for 
sorting growers by ability even when a relative-performance contract is used.  Four specific 
results from Tables 2, 3, and 4 are summarized below. 
Result 1:  When a relatively large proportion of high-ability growers exist and the 
technology exhibits high returns to scale, an offering of two separating contracts can often 
improve the processor’s expected profit and total welfare of both processor and growers relative 
to the single pooling contract.  However, only growers in the upper portion of the ability 
distribution are better off under a two-tournament separating contract offering, while all other 
grower including all lower-ability growers and the rest of the high-ability growers are worse off.    26
By optimally offering two separating contracts, the processor provides sufficient incentives 
to have growers with heterogeneous abilities self-select into their own leagues.  Given the 
optimal contracts, high-ability growers reveal their ability types by selecting the contract G C .  
Consequently, the relatively high bonus payment specified in this contract induces high-ability 
growers to exert greater efforts and, hence, the processor obtains more output and extracts more 
surpluses.  Most of the results depicted in Tables 2, 3, and 4 show that separating contracts can 
raise the processor’s expected profit (i.e., Profit(S) > Profit(P)) and the total welfare of growers 
and the processor (i.e., Welf(S) > Welf(P)).  The exception to this result occurs when both ability 
is skewed to the right and returns to scale are low (i.e., p and q < 1).  The bottom half of Table 3 
depicts the exception.  In this one exception, a single pooling contract leads to slightly higher 
total expected welfare but lower expected processor profits. 
Compared with the pooling contract, the separating contracts offer greater rewards to 
growers with relatively higher abilities while offering smaller rewards to relatively less able 
growers.  In other words, the processor extracts more surplus with the separating contracts by 
assigning stronger penalties to less able growers and stronger rewards to high-ability growers.  
Using results in the top portion of Table 4 as an example, Figure 1 shows that the optimal 
separating ability is 2.1.  Therefore, growers with ability within the range [1, 2.1) would choose 
contract B C , while growers with ability within [2.1, 3] would choose contract  G C .   In this case, 
separating contracts improve the processor’s expected profit and total welfare over a pooling 
contract.  However, Figure 1, which is based on the same scenario, also shows that the separating 
contracts make growers with ability below 2.6 worse off and those with ability above 2.6 better 
off than with a pooling contract.  Thus, by separating growers into different ability groups, the 
processor provides stronger incentives to have high-ability growers exert more effort and extracts   27
more surplus.  In return, more able growers receive extra compensation for revealing their 
ability.   
Result 2:  A cream-skimming contract can sometimes improve the processor’s expected 
profit and total welfare over a pooling contract. 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show that, under certain conditions, a cream-skimming contract improves 
the processor’s profit and total welfare over a pooling contract.  However, the optimality of a 
cream-skimming contract depends on the distribution of grower ability and on the returns-to-
scale parameters p and q.  The cream-skimming contract improves the processor’s expected 
profits in cases where the ability distribution is skewed left (e.g., from Table 4, Profit(CS) > 
Profit(P)); however, when the ability distribution is symmetric or skewed right, cream-skimming 
improves expected profits only when p and q = 1 and not when p and q < 1.  Cream-skimming 
improves expected total welfare in even fewer cases, i.e., when p and q = 1 and when the ability 
distribution is either symmetric or left skewed.  Intuitively, if the returns-to-scale factors p and q 
and the proportion of high-ability growers are both small, then the processor’s cost of having 
high-ability growers’ types revealed would exceed the benefit of separating more able growers 
from less able growers.  In that case, only a pooling contract would be optimal. 
We also find that the cream-skimming contract never improves on the separating contracts.  
However, if there are positive costs (e.g., political, legal, or financial) of preparing and offering 
more than one contract, then offering a cream-skimming contract could become justifiable.  
While this outcome would result is less than full employment for the fixed number of growers, 
the average utility of each grower remaining under contract is often higher under the cream-
skimming contract than under the pooling contract.   28
Result 3:  The optimal bonus and base payment in contract  G C  exceed those in contract B C .  
Moreover, the contract terms in contract G C  exceed those in the pooling contract P C , while the 
contract terms in contract B C are smaller than those in contract P C . 
 The results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 show that the processor offers greater bonus and base 
payment to the more able group G than those to the less able group B.  Consequently, growers 
belonging to the low-ability group would prefer their own contract  B C  to the contract  G C  
because of the greater expected penalty associated with joining the high-ability league.  On the 
other hand, given the relatively high bonus and base payment, more able growers would prefer 
the contract  G C  to the contract  B C  because they would receive a smaller base payment by 
joining the low-ability league.  The base payment B α  must be smaller than  G α  because, 
otherwise, a more able grower would be always better off by deviating given that B β  is smaller 
than G β  .  Thus, the optimal contract for the high-ability group offers a positive information rent 
through the base payment G α .  Therefore, the grower with ability a ˆ  is just indifferent between 
the contract G C  and  B C , and all other grower types in the group B strictly prefer the contract B C  
to the contract  G C .   However, the optimal base payment to the high-ability group must be 
sufficiently small such that a less able grower in group B would not deviate and choose the 
contract G C .   
Compared to CP, the contract terms in G C  and  B C  also reflect the different incentives that 
the processor must provide to more able and less able growers.  Consistent with standard contract 
theory, the processor offers a suboptimal contract to less able growers to reduce the information 
rents rewarded to more able growers.    29
Result 4:  Keeping all other parameters fixed, increases in mean grower ability or returns-
to-scale factors (i.e., p and q) raise the optimal processor’s profit, growers’ total utility, and total 
welfare.  
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the effects of increasing mean grower ability in various scenarios.  
In these scenarios, we are careful to change only the mean ability without affecting the variance.  
Equivalently, this change could be envisioned as a parallel shift of the distribution, or more 
intuitively it can be thought of as a systematic improvement of grower ability – possibly through 
exogenous technical change or learning.  Hence, growers’ output increases, and growers’ 
production costs decrease as well.  Consequently, the processor could capture more gains and 
offer greater rewards to all growers.   
The effects of scale factors p and q on growers’ and the processor’s welfare are similar to 
changes in growers’ mean ability.  As these factors increase, growers become more productive 
and, hence, the processor could capture more surpluses.  We note, however, that the effects of p 
and q depend on numerical values of aanda .  Since derivations of optimal contract terms 
involve moments of growers abilities, the effects of p and q are unambiguous only when 
1 0 ≤ < ≤ a a  or  ∞ < < ≤ a a 1 .  If  ∞ < < < ≤ a a 1 0 , the effects of p and q would be different.  
For instance, when a < 1, 
3 a  decreases, but 
3 / 1 a increases with marginal increases in a.  When    
a > 1, 
3 a  increases, but 
3 / 1 a decreases.   Therefore, in this paper, we assume  ∞ < < ≤ a a 1  
throughout the numerical simulations.  
In addition, Tables 2, 3, and 4 show that existence of optimal separating contracts or 
cream-skimming contracts depends on the relative distance between the lower and upper limit of 
grower ability given any distribution function of grower ability.  As the mean grower ability 
increases without changing the variance, the relative distance  a a a / ) ( −  is also reduced.  This   30
change affects the cost of separating more able growers from less able growers.  For instance, the 
cost of separating growers from a distribution with range [10, 11] would exceed that from a 
distribution with range [0, 1].   As the relative distance a a a / ) ( −  becomes sufficiently small, an 
optimal separating contract might not exist and only a pooled single-tournament could be 
optimal.   
Special cases:  Sensitivity analyses concerning parameter values reveal two special cases 
where features of the model presented above degenerate to features used in existing research.  
One special case occurs occur when k = 0 so that reservation utilities are uniformly zero for all n 
growers regardless of ability level; the other special case occurs when p = 0, q = 1, and φ =1 so 
that the output function is additive in effort and independent of ability.    
In the case of k = 0, model results (not presented) are largely consistent with those 
presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  As with the more general cases on the tables, compared to the 
standard pooling contract offering, higher expected profits for the processor are still possible 
under an offering of separating contracts regardless of how ability is distributed or the value of 
the scaling parameters.  Higher total welfare for both the processor and growers is also still 
possible with separating contracts, except in the case when ability is right-skewed and the scaling 
parameters, p and q are less than 1.  The only major difference concerns the feasibility of optimal 
separating contracts.  When k > 0, the set of feasible solutions is restricted.  An economic 
interpretation of this result is that k can be thought as reflecting the level of exogenously 
determined economic activity outside the contract sector.  As k increases, the value of outside 
opportunities increase – particularly for high ability workers, and it becomes increasingly 
difficult to for a principal to construct a contract targeted to high-ability growers that provides 
greater expected utility than the non-random reservation utility.   31
In the case of p = 0, q = 1, and φ =1, when the output function is addititive, model results 
are again consistent with those in Tables 2, 3 and 4.  A pair of separating contracts can be found 
that improves profitability over the single pooling contract.  The same results hold for improving 
total expected welfare, except when the ability distribution is skewed to the right. 
When examined collectively, the results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 tell a fairly consistent story.  
Most importantly, the results show that, compared to a single contract offering that pools all 
growers, an offering of separating contracts is able to improve the processor’s expected profits in 
every case examined; such an offering can also improve the processor’s and growers’ joint 
welfare in nearly every case.    A similar comparison between the single pooling contract and a 
single cream-skimming contract is not as consistent:  A cream-skimming offering can improve 
processor profitability and joint welfare, but there are numerous cases where the pooling contract 
may be preferred.  Two conditions – sufficiently large returns-to-scale factors and a large 
proportion of high-ability growers (i.e., a symmetric distribution or a left-skewed distribution of 
grower ability) – favor both the offering of two separating contracts and a single cream-
skimming contract relative to the single pooling contract offering.  Another consistent finding in 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 concerns how a separating contract offering redistributes welfare.  In all 
scenarios, the separating contract offers greater rewards only to the upper portion of the high-
ability league and penalizes all other growers relative to the single pooling contract offering.  
However, when the proportion of high-ability growers is small and the technology exhibits 
decreasing returns, a separating contract or a cream-skimming contract may be less preferred 
than the pooling contract offering.     32
Conclusion and Implications 
Conventional wisdom regards linear relative-performance contracts as rendering 
unnecessary any efforts to sort agents by ability.  To the contrary, we find that a uniform 
treatment of workers’ marginal benefits from effort and uniform outside opportunities are 
responsible for this standard result.  When differences in agents’ outside opportunities and 
marginal rewards from effort are instead accounted for, we show that sorting agents into ability 
groups can help counter this failure and improve processor profits and joint welfare.  We show 
that linear relative-performance contracts can discourage the highest ability growers from putting 
forth their strongest efforts.  In our extended framework, we find that separating contracts and 
sometimes even cream-skimming contracts can improve profitability and welfare.   
These results, which stem from our model development, come with several shortcomings 
or limitations.  Our inability to solve analytically for the optimal a ˆ  leads directly to two major 
limitations:  First, we are unable to solve for the sufficient conditions that guarantee existence of 
an equilibrium or that guarantee improved profitability.  And second, we resort to finding a ˆ  
through the use of a numerical example that is not calibrated to match, for example, the broiler 
industry.  Balanced against these limitations is the practicality of our methods, which a broiler 
processor or some other principal could easily follow to find a ˆ  given proper calibration from 
proprietary data. 
 We note above that the improvements from separating contracts come at the expense of 
less-able workers, who are as a rule worse off.  Our results, therefore, begin to encroach on a 
potentially larger policy issue:  namely, the political feasibility and social desirability of 
tournament-style contracts.  In the poultry sector, for example, industry observers often connect 
tournament-style contracts to grower dissatisfaction.  While there may be multiple reasons for   33
grower-voiced complaints about contracts, it is clear that the design of tournament contracts 
leads to the identification and penalization of under-performers, who very well may be a prime 
source of complaints.  Placed in this setting, an offering of multiple contracts designed to 
separate growers further may lead to even more complaints.  As we note above, lower-ability 
growers are clearly worse off under a separating contract offering.  From a social standpoint, 
therefore, improvements that accrue to processors and the highest-ability growers may fail to 
offset the political costs associated with separating grower by ability.  In other words, political 
realities may favor a pooling outcome.  A similar argument can be made if multiple contract 
offerings result in higher legal or financial costs.   
The potential political preferences for pooling may inadvertently open the door for cream 
skimming, however.  Like the standard contract, the cream-skimming contract discussed above 
pools growers; but it causes the lowest-ability growers to reject the contract voluntarily.  
Politically, a cream-skimming contract may seem fairer than a separating contract.  Because we 
show above that a cream-skimming contract benefits the processor under a number of possible 
scenarios, processors with political sensitivities may have reason to favor cream-skimming 
contracts to separating contracts.     34
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Table 1: Parameters used in the numerical example 
 




u σ   0.5 
k  0.01 
φ   1 
p, q  1,  1/3 
a ( or al)  See following tables 
a (or ah)  See following tables 
   37
Table 2:  Optimal Contracts Under a Symmetric Beta Distribution (z = 2, w = 2) 
Symmetric Beta Distribution (z = 2, w = 2) and p = q = 1 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.5317  2.407     56.17  119.4  175.5  1.123 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
1.6 39 11  0.622  3.38  0.191 0.0825  51.9  131.8  183.7  1.038 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a  
3 = a  
E(a)=2 
 var(a)=0.2  Cream-
skimming  1.5  42    0.602  3.11      52.84 127.6  180.5 1.258 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.5613  4.744     105.7  233.8  339.5  2.114 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
2.1  39  11  0.663  6.62  0.238 0.282  94.96 257.7  352.7 1.899 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a .5 
3 = a .5 
 E(a)=2.5 
 var(a)=0.2  Cream-
skimming  2  42    0.642  6.11      96.68 247.4  344.1 2.302 
Symmetric Beta Distribution (z = 2, w = 2) and p = q = 1/3 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.3285  0.1618     4.846  40.1  44.95  0.09691 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
1.5 42  8  0.422  0.186  0.14 0.0346  4.019  41.12  45.14  0.0804 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a  
3 = a  
E(a)=2 
 var(a)=0.2  Cream-
skimming  1.3 46    0.385  0.173      4.216  38.56  42.77  0.09165 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.3753  0.1903     5.176  47.2  52.38  0.1035 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
2 42 8 0.462 0.216  0.183 0.0495  4.342  48.08  52.43  0.0868 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a .5 
3 = a .5 
 E(a)=2.5 
 var(a)=0.2  Cream-
skimming  1.7 48    0.411  0.197      4.729  46.33  51.06  0.09853 
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Table 3:  Optimal Contracts Under an Asymmetric Beta Distribution (z = 2, w = 4) 
Asymmetric Beta Distribution (z = 2, w = 4) and p = q = 1 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.5489  1.432     31.5  70.58  102.1  0.63 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
1.6  26  24  0.693  2.74  0.347 0.259  27.78 76.44  104.2 0.556 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a  
3 = a  
E(a)=1.667 
var(a)=0.127  Cream-
skimming  1.2 45    0.588  1.64      29.92  71.93  101.8  0.6649 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.5944  3.243     66.51  158.8  225.3  1.33 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
1.8  41  9  0.664  4.09  0.305 0.278  60.95 166.6  227.6 1.219 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a .5 
3 = a .5 
 E(a)=2.167 
 var(a)=0.127  Cream-
skimming  1.6 48    0.616  3.42      63.99  160  224  1.333 
Asymmetric Beta Distribution (z = 2, w = 4) and p = q = 1/3 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.3626  0.1463     3.896  36.79  40.68  0.07791 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
1.1 48  2  0.387  0.152 0.398 0.0425  3.729  36.94  40.67  0.0746 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a  
3 = a  
E(a)=1.667 
var(a)=0.127  Cream-
skimming  1.1 48    0.387  0.152      3.702  35.81  39.51  0.07712 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.4141  0.1758     4.149  44.33  48.48  0.08297 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
1.6 48  2  0.436  0.182 0.369 0.0402  3.954  44.49  48.44  0.0791 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a .5 
3 = a .5 
 E(a)=2.167 
 var(a)=0.127  Cream-
skimming  1.6 48    0.436  0.182      3.923  43.01  46.93  0.08173 
   39
Table 4:  Optimal Contracts Under an Asymmetric Beta Distribution (z = 4, w = 2) 
Asymmetric Beta Distribution (z = 4, w = 2) and p = q = 1 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.5246  3.499     83.57  173.9  257.5  1.671 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
2.1  37  13  0.715  5.71  0.197 0.215  67.08 213.1  280.2 1.342 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a  
3 = a  
E(a)=2.333 
var(a)=0.127  Cream-
skimming  2 40    0.685  5.22      69.34  202  271.3  1.733 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.546  6.402     147.9  316.7  464.6  2.958 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
2.5  40  10  0.722 9.55 0.19 0.34  118.2  382  500.2  2.364 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a .5 
3 = a .5 
 E(a)=2.833 
 var(a)=0.127  Cream-
skimming  2.5  40    0.722  9.55      116.6 364.9  481.4 2.914 
Asymmetric Beta Distribution (z = 4, w = 2) and p = q = 1/3 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.3048  0.1766     5.659  43.42  49.08  0.1132 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
1.7 47  3  0.43  0.189 0.059 0.018  4.134  45.94  50.08  0.0827 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a  
3 = a  
E(a)=2.333 
var(a)=0.127  Cream-
skimming  1.7 47    0.43  0.189      4.091  44.36  48.45  0.08705 
    P β   P α      TotUtil(P) Profit(P) Welf(P) AvgUtil(P)  Pooling 
    0.3472  0.204     6.039  50.12  56.16  0.1208 
a ˆ  
G n
B n G β   G α   B β   B α   TotUtil(S) Prof(S) Welf(S) AvgUtil(S)  Separating 
2.2 47  3  0.467  0.217 0.078 0.0243  4.374  52.52  56.89  0.0875 
a ˆ  
G n   CS β   CS α      TotUtil(CS) Prof(CS)  Welf(CS)  AvgUtil(CS) 
Parameters: 
1 = a .5 
3 = a .5 
 E(a)=2.833 
 var(a)=0.127  Cream-
skimming  2.1 48    0.448  0.213      4.575  51.06  55.64  0.0953   40
Figure 1: Growers’ Expected Utility and Reservation Utility Under a Two-tournament Contract 
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